Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Negation, philosophy, logic: negation of a sentence. In logic, this is done by prefixing the negation symbol. Colloquially expressed by the word "not", which can be at different positions in the sentence. If the negation refers only to one sentence part, this must be made clear by the position, e.g. a predicate can be denied without negating the whole sentence. In logic, therefore, inner and outer negation is distinguished by the use of different symbols._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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H. Wessel on Negation - Dictionary of Arguments
I 157 Negation/Frege: Frege does not distinguish between internal and external negation. >Internal negation, >External negation, >Negation/Frege, >G. Frege. I 325 Terms/Negation/Wessel: singular terms and categorical terms (which include everything) can not be negated. >Singular terms. General terms can be negated. >General terms. Negation of singular terms: is only possible in a range of 2 items and again leads to a singular term. "Non-object": is no term! Negation of "swimmer" is not "non-swimmers", but also e.g., iron._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27